

Appendix I: El Sayyid Nosair Documents

Documents found in El Sayyid Nosair's house after the murder of Rabbi Meier Kahane.



A. Location of Selected Special Forces units on December 5, 1988, from Fort Bragg, with Ali Mohamed's Arabic notations.

546 • APPENDIX I



TOP SECRET FOR TRAINING OTHERWISE UNCLAS

B. JSC Warning order from Joint Chiefs of Staff to all key U.S. commands, from Fort Bragg, with AM's Arabic notations.

Appendix VI: Yousef-Scarpa Intelligence

The Ramzi Yousef-Gregory Scarpa Jr. intelligence.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION


Date of transcription 3/7/96

At the request of GREGORY SCARPA, JR., Date of Birth: August 3, 1951, he was interviewed at the Office of the United States Attorney, Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, New York. Present at this interview was SCARPA's Attorney, Lawrence Silverman, Assistant United States Attorneys (AUSA) DEITRICH SNELL and PATRICK FITZGERALD, Southern District of New York and EVELYN CORCELLA, and VALERIE CAPRONI, Chief of the Criminal Division, Eastern District of New York, and Special Agents PAMELA M. McDAID and HOWARD LEADBETTER II (FBI); and RICHARD CORAGGIO (INS).

A. FBI 302 from March 7, 1996, recording a session between Scarpa Jr. and his lawyer, Larry Silverman, with a host of key Feds. Present at this meeting was Patrick Fitzgerald, head of Organized Crime and Terrorism in the SDNY along with Valerie Caproni, head of the Criminal Division in the EDNY; Dietrich Snell, the AUSA who was about to coprosecute Yousef in the Bojinka case; Ellen Corcella, the AUSA running many of the Colombo war prosecutions in the EDNY; and Howard Leadbetter II, one of the original three FBI agents whose allegations about DeVecchio and Greg Scarpa Sr. led to the opening of the FBI OPR. Both Fitzgerald and Caproni had multiple meetings with Scarpa Jr.


How To Smuggle Explosives into an airplane Sun 5/19
I When Talking about smuggling Explosives into an Airplane,
IT is meant By That Explosive Substances which are going
To Be placed into an adoptane later, To Be Used For Olowing
up The airplanes. There Fore The quantity OF EXPLOSIVE Substaces
Which we'll Be Tolking about, is The quantity needed To Blow-
up an airphane, Which is equivernat to 300 gm of TNT For
1747-400 arplanes, at 30,000 Feet altitude. For Substances
Which are more power Ful Than T.N.T., The quantity needed
Would Be Less Than 300 gm depending on it's power compared
To TINT
2. OLL METALIC SUBSTANCES, ON SUBSTANCES Which CONTRIBES METALS
CANNOT Be used or smuggled into The airplane Because They
are easily detected By X-Ray machines and METAL Detectors,
There Fore, all Aziness and mercury compounds Explosive
Substances SHOWLD NOT Be Used.
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
3 all Explosive Substances of a Density Ligher Than 2 kg/L
SHOULD NOT BE used due to The possibility OF Detecting
Them by X-Ray Machines.
The Following Explisive Substances Have a Density Less Than
2 am can Easily Or Smuggled, I. Tetrazene (Gunnyl Nitrosonminogun- nyltetrazene)
ACETONE PERENTER NE)
3 R.D.X.
4 HMTO (Hexamethy Leneta Sperox - Toediamine)
5. DDN.P. (DIAZodinitrophenic) 6. HMX. (Cyclotetramethy Leneteta— (ANITRAMINE
all Liquio Explosives CAN Be used
1. When an Explosive Substance is smuggled into AN Airphone, Than it
CAN Be assembled casily inside the airplane
2. A Box DETONATOR CAN BE HTO IN a HEEL OF a Store
3. The Wiring and 9V Battery CAN Be HODEN INSIDE a SHAVING
machine or a Toy
The above Explosive Substances which are in ibudar
Form Can also Be Smuggled In An Airplane casily By Hising
Them IN The Holes in The Heal of a Stoe, or By putting Thom
/ 1
IN Medicine Capsulas.

B. May 19, 1996, "kite" from Ramzi Yousef to Greg Scarpa Jr. entitled "How to Smuggle Explosives Into An Airplane." The note suggests several alternatives to nitroglycerine as a high explosive, including RDX and "acetone peroxide," later suspected by British authorities of being one of the key ingredients in the August 2006 transatlantic airliner bombing plot.



C. Schematic of Yousef's Casio-nitro bomb trigger, passed to Scarpa Jr. in a kite, May 1996. No high school-educated wiseguy could ever have fabricated such evidence; nor did Yousef have any motive for revealing this design to the Feds, since it would have ensured a guilty verdict at his trial.

At the trial, months after Scarpa Jr. retrieved this schematic, with its specific mention of a C106D semi-conductor, AUSAs Dietrich Snell and Mike Garcia referred to the use of that device, soldered inside a Casio DBC-61 watch, as Yousef's unique "signature"—a position that clearly undercut the Feds (including Patrick Fitzgerald) who later tried to dismiss the Yousef-Scarpa Jr. intelligence as a "hoax" and a "scam."



D. Photo of the actual Casio-nitro bomb trigger seized from Yousef's "bomb factory," Room 603 at the Dona Josefa apartments in Manila. Its design was a precursor to the schematic in Yousef's kite.

265A-NY-252802

Continuation of FD-302 of GREGORY SCARPA, JR.

.On 3/5/96 .Page ___

SCARPA advised that YOUSEF began slipping papers to him, 1/2 sheet of paper rolled up with writing on them. According to SCARPA, YOUSEF writes in sentences. SCARPA advised that when YOUSEF slips him these papers he writes on the paper that he wants them back. SCARPA advised he has only kept the notes for a matter of minutes, approximately 10 minutes, just long enough to write some things down. SCARPA advised he may get one note a day or one every couple of days. According to SCARPA, the number of notes varies according to the circumstances at the mcc. SCARPA advised YOUSEF does not give his notes back to him, but expects SCARPA to return YOUSEF's notes quickly. SCARPA believes YOUSEF throws the notes in the toilet.

SCARPA advised these notes, referred to as "kites" are passed from inmate to inmate, in newspapers, or through holes in the walls of the cells.

SCARPA advised that there is a guard permanently assigned to both ISMAIL and YOUSEF and sometimes they check the newspaper before its given to ISMAIL or YOUSEF and sometimes they do not

According to SCARPA, YOUSEF told him, "if you're interested, I'll teach you things nobody knows."

YOUSEF told SCARPA I'll teach you how to blow up airplanes, and how to make bombs and then you can get the information to your people (meaning SCARPA's people on the outside). YOUSEF told SCARPA I can show you how to get a bomb on an airplane through a metal detector. YOUSEF told SCARPA he would teach him how to make timing devices.

According to SCARPA, YOUSEF wants to hurt the United States Government and wants to teach SCARPA how. SCARPA advised YOUSEF has not asked for any specific help. SCARPA advised that YOUSEF wants to blow things up, but he does not say why.

YOUSEF told SCARPA that during the trial they had a, plan to blow up a plane to show that they are serious and then make their demands, or kidnap and hurt a judge or an attorney so a mistrial will be declared. SCARPA advised that blowing up an airplane during the trial seems easy to YOUSEF. YOUSEF never mentioned a specific airline as a target.

According to SCARPA, YOUSEF believes that SCARPA is in touch with people on the outside. YOUSEF told SCARPA if things get going we may be able to hook up, if you're serious my people and your people can meet. SCARPA believes YOUSEF needs help

E. FBI 302 of March 5, 1996, recording the threat communicated by Ramzi Yousef to Greg Scarpa Jr. The 302, which notes how Yousef "began slipping papers" to Scarpa Jr., is the first of many recording Yousef's "plan to blow up a plane . . . so that a mistrial will be declared" in the Bojinka case. TWA 800 blew up on the night before Murad's confession to Col. Mendoza—among the most damning evidence against Yousef—was to be entered at trial. The morning after the crash, July 18, 1996, Yousef moved for a mistrial.

558 • APPENDIX VI

Mayq	
How are you Buddy?	
I Hope your CASE Went Well For you To Day.	
LESTEN BO as I TOLD you My LAWYER IS PRETTY GOOD,	
as soon as He Received The INFO From my people, He	
Brought it right up	
212-587-1328-PhoNE- AS I alkary gave you.	
You're To Say; Ronnie Calling - I'm Like To make apple	×
you send your FAX TO;	
Geoge Smith % ROMA CORP	
175 Stave Suite 2252	
N.y. N.y. 10010	

F. The kite from Scarpa Jr. to Yousef on May 9, 1996, announcing the creation of "Roma Corp.," the front company devised by the FBI for intercepting Yousef's outside calls to his "people" in New York and aboard. This intelligence initiative, which continued throughout the summer of 1996—well past the crash of TWA 800—further proves that the FBI believed in the legitimacy of Greg Jr.'s intelligence from Yousef.

566 • APPENDIX VI

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ADX WARDEN

PAGE 82/82



U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Prisons

United States Penitentiary Administrative Maximum

Office of the Warden

P.O. Box 8500

Florence, CO 81226-8500

July 6, 2004

Peter Anthony Lance c/o Regan Books Harper Collins 18th Floor 10 East 53rd St. New York, NY 10022

Dear Mr. Lance:

This is in response to your correspondence dated July 1, 2004, received by fax on July 2, 2004, in which you request permission to conduct an interview with inmate Gregory Scarpa.

The Bureau of Prisons makes every effort to accommodate media personnel as long as the request does not negatively affect the security and operation of our institutions. It is my determination, based on my sound correctional judgement, that to grant your request at this time could pose a risk to the internal security of this institution and to the safety of staff, inmates and members of the public. Therefore, your request has been denied and you will not be permitted to conduct an interview with inmate Scarpa at this time.

Please feel free to contact my Executive Assistant and Public Information Officer, Wendy Montgomery, at 719/784-9464, if you have any further questions regarding this letter.

Sincerely,

Robert A. Hood

Warden

by fax (212)734-0056

H. Response from the warden of the ADX Florence (Supermax) to the author's July 2004 request for an interview with Greg Scarpa Jr. Prison officials failed to respond to a second interview request from the author submitted as late as September 20, 2006.

Appendix VII: Flight 800 Documents

Documents regarding the 747 that became TWA 800.



A. Illustration of the C concourse at St. Louis Lambert International Airport as it was in June 1996. The 747 that became TWA Flight 800 (N-93 17119) was parked at Gate 50, while an almost identical 747 (N-93 17116) was parked at Gate 52 around the corner.



B. The TWA gate assignment from June 10, 1996, showing that N-93 17119, the aircraft that exploded as TWA 800 on July 17, 1996, left Gate 50 at 12:35 p.m. on June 10, and took off fully catered and crewed bound for Honolulu only 35 minutes after K-9 Officer Herman Burnett finished his test. Yet the 747 around the corner at Gate 52 (N-93-17116) didn't leave until 1:45 p.m. more than 90 minutes later. Officer Burnett later recalled that his "notes and memory at the time . . . told [him] that it had to be the other plane" [93-17116] on which he'd performed the K-9 test.

Appendix IX: Presidential Brief about Rahman

The infamous Presidential Daily Brief of August 6, 2001, which the Bush White House tried to keep from the 9/11 Commission, discussed a plot to hijack a plane to free the blind Sheikh and a "senior EIJ member" living in California. Given to the president just weeks before the 9/11 attacks, the PDB, entitled "Bin Laden Determined to Strike in U.S.," underscores not only the importance of Sheikh Rahman to al Qaeda; vindicating the Able Danger intelligence, but it references Ali Mohamed as both a senior Egyptian Islamic Jihad member and one of the al Qaeda members found guilty in the embassy bombing, noting that al Qaeda members have maintained a support structure in the United States. The memo also vindicates Greg Scarpa Jr., who learned from Yousef of at least four al Qaeda operatives in NYC in 1996.

572 • APPENDIX IX

Bin Ladin Determined To Strike in US



Clandestine, foreign government, and media reports indicate Bin Ladin since 1997 has wanted to conduct terrorist attacks in the US. Bin Ladin implied in US television interviews in 1997 and 1998 that his followers would follow the example of World Trade Center bomber Ramzi Yousef and "bring the lighting to America."

After US missile strikes on his base in Afghanistan in 1998, Bin Ladin told followers he wanted to retaliate in Washington, according to a service.

An Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) operative told an service at the same time that Bin Ladin was planning to exploit the operative's access to the US to mount a terrorist strike.

The millennium plotting in Canada in 1999 may have been part of Bin Ladin's first serious attempt to implement a terrorist strike in the US. Convicted plotter Ahmed Ressam has told the FBI that he conceived the idea to attack Los Angeles International Airport himself, but that Bin Ladin lieutenant Abu Zubaydah encouraged him and helped facilitate the operation. Ressam also said that in 1998 Abu Zubaydah was planning his own US attack.

Ressam says Bin Ladin was aware of the Los Angeles operation.

Although Bin Ladin has not succeeded, his attacks against the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 demonstrate that he prepares operations years in advance and is not deterred by setbacks. Bin Ladin associates surveilled our Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam as early as 1993, and some members of the Nairobi cell planning the bombings were arrested and deported in 1997.

Al-Qa'ida members—including some who are US citizens—have resided in or traveled to the US for years, and the group apparently maintains a support structure that could aid attacks. Two al-Qa'ida members found guilty in the conspiracy to bomb our Embassies in East Africa were US citizens, and a senior EIJ member lived in California in the mid-1990s.

A clandestine source said in 1998 that a Bin Ladin cell in New York was recruiting Muslim-American youth for attacks.

We have not been able to corroborate some of the more sensational threat reporting, such as that from a service in 1998 saying that Bin Ladin wanted to hijack a US aircraft to gain the release of "Blind Shaykh" 'Umar 'Abd al-Rahman and other US-held extremists.

Appendix X: Unindicted Coconspirators in the Day of Terror Trial

A 1994 List of 172 Unindicted Coconspirators in the Day of Terror Trial, Including Osama Bin Laden, Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, Ali Mohamed, the Murteza Brothers, Waleed al-Noor, Co-Owner of Sphinx Trading and the Long-Deceased Abdullah Azzam and Mustafa Shalabi.

1	Ahmed Muhammad	Aasran
2	Mohammed Yousef	Abbas

- 3 Jamal Abdelgani
- 4 Mohammed Hassan Abdou
- 5 Emad Abdou
- 6 Amad Elden Abdou
- 7 Abdalhele A. Abwalannen
- 8 Dawud Adib
- 9 Hosni Ahmed
- 10 Mohssen Ahmed
- 11 Nasser Al Din Alamani
- 12 Majdi Alghamrawi
- 13 Hekmat Alhadashek
- 14 Abd Al Hafez Mustafa Ali
- 15 Atif Ahmed Ali
- 16 Hamdi Ali
- 17 Samy Ali
- 18 Sharif Ali
- 19 Mike Alkam
- 21 Hassan Karim Allah
- 22 Abu Abdullah
- 23 Othman Abdullah
- 24 Abu Abdulla Alnagar
- 25 Raef Alwishe
- 26 Saleem Amin
- 27 Hiam Arazy
- 28 Mustafa Assad (Boriqua)
- 29 Moneeb Ashraf
- 30 Mohammed Atiyah
- 31 Sami Atiya
- 32 Amin Awad
- 33 Mona Awad
- 34 Abdellah Azzam

- 35 Mohammed Azzam
- 36 Ahab Ashraf Abdul Azziz
- 37 Hasab el Rasoul Mohamed Babiker
- 38 Abdul Basir (Tito)
- 39 Ahmed Bilal
- 40 Adnan Constantine
- 41 Fawaz Damra
- 42 Ahmed Al Dalta Daota
- 43 Halim Abul Efni
- 44 Moustafa Elaebrak
- 45 Mahmud Elder
- 46 Nimmer Elder
- 47 Ahmed Mansour El-Eslah
- 48 Ali El-Gabrowny
- 49 Mohammed El-Gabrowny
- 50 Ahmed Elganainy
- 52 Ali Al Faqueer
- 53 Shawki Abd Al Fariz
- 54 Umar Faruqq
- 55 Abu Al Walid Gizeh
- 56 Abdel Hafez
- 57 Sahied Hahmad
- 58 Mohamed Ahmed Al Haj
- 59 Isam Abdul Hakim
-)) Isam Modul 11
- 60 Saad Hanafi
- 61 Esteshamel Haque
- 62 Quazi Haque
- 63 Hameed LNU
- 64 Hesham El Hamamey
- 65 Hammid Hammid
- 66 Jack Hamrick
- 67 Mohammed Al Hanooti

- 68 Fathy M. Hassan
- 69 Sabri Hassan (John Kinard)
- 70 Ibrahim Higazi
- 71 Nasser Homosany
- 72 Khalid LNU
- 73 Alaa Ibrahim
- 74 Khalid Ibrahim
- 75 Mamdouh Ibrahim
- 76 Muhammad Shawqi Islambouli
- 77 Abdel Rahman Ja'afar
- 78 Al Sayyid Sami Jamal
- 79 Mahir Al Jamal
- 80 Kamal Al Jayh
- 81 Ali Abdul Kareem
- 82 Ahmed Kazalek
- 83 Abdel Khalek
- 84 Walid Khalid
- 85 Yah Yah Ibn Khalid
- 86 Muhammed Khalifa
- 97 A 1 1/ 1/1
- 87 Ashraq Kahlil
- 88 Samir Khalil
- 89 Abd Al Khaliq
- 90 Atif Mahmood Khan
- 91 Ahmed Khatteria
- 92 Tareq Khatteria
- 93 Lawrence L. Khidr
- 94 Y'aqub Kursam
- 95 Osama Bin Ladin
- 96 Khalil Lahoud
- 97 Yousef Maani
- 98 Mokhtar Mahmoud
- 99 Adel Mahroud

574 • APPENDIX X

122 Ahmed Muneer

100	Hamam Sayeed Mahseen	123	Daniel Murteza	145	Muhammad Samir
101	Ahmed Abd Al Majeed	124	Raymond Murteza	146	Ahmed Samy
102	Abd Al Manaâm	125	Hamdi Musa		(Samy Mohammed Ali)
103	Abd Al Halimi Mansour	126	Omar Mohammed Musa	147	Ahmed Abdel Sattar
104	Said Mansour	127	Majed Mustafa	148	Sabir Shakir
105	Hassan El Mansouri	128	Adel El Nasser	149	Mustafa Shalabi
106	Safullah McNeil	129	Mustafa Dauod Mustafa	150	Mustafa Al Shareef
107	Ahmed Megali		Nassar	158	Sirraj Wahhaj
108	Mohamed Mehdi	130	Waleed A. Noor	159	Sudanese Mission to the
109	Ali A. Mohamed	131	Kamal Muhamad Omar		United Nations
110	Arioua Mostafa	132	Bilal Phillips	160	Abdul Wali
111	Adel Said Mohammed	133	Fatahi Qoura	161	Madha Warda
112	Ashraf Mohammed	134	Nabig Ragab	162	Seraj LNU
113	Mouaki Benani Mohammed	135	Mikial Abdur Rahim	163	Shawkat M. Wehidy
114	Mohmoud Mohmoud		(Richard Smith)	164	Khalid Younis
115	Hassan Mousa	136	Nabir Abu Abd Al Rakhi	165	Nasser Younis
116	Mohammed Mousa	137	Frank Ramos	166	Ahmed Yousef
117	Sami Mousa	138	Abu Obaida Rouas	167	Mahmud Yousef
118	Ahmed H. Moustafa	139	Yehyeh Sabor	168	Yousef Bin Yousef
119	Assan Muhammad	140	Hussein Saffan	169	Zakariah
120	Hanif Muhammad	141	Mustafa Saif	170	Badre Zhony
	(Abu Hanif)	142	Saifuldin	171	Ahmed Zidan
121	Moustafa Muhammad	143	Tharwat Saleh	172	Ibrahim Foxmanef

144 Tariq Mustafa Salem

(Abe Foxman)